Perspectives from the Philippines

This paper demonstrates the link between fertility transition and the achievement of millenium development goals (MDGs) from the perspective of the age-structural transition. Using the Philippine experience and drawing data from the census and other secondary sources, this paper elaborates on the interactions between fertility, age-structure and the MDGs. It is descriptive in design and theoretical rather than statistical in approach. The perspective of age-structural transition as mediating link between fertility transition and the MDGs allows governments to plan and evaluate programs on the basis of their responsiveness to the changing needs and capabilities of the population from the standpoint of gender and life course. In the Philippines, fertility decline has been slow, and although the proportions of children and adolescents are declining, their numbers continue to rise, especially in the poorer segment of society. Consequently, the country has difficulty in meeting the dietary, educational and reproductive health needs of its population (MDG numbers 1,2 and 5) and in providing jobs and adequate income for its growing number of young and older adults. The Philippines faces the dual challenge of providing for a larger population-in-need and not having adequate resources to do so. Yet it is recognized that the same MDGs that the country is having difficulty in achieving are actually prerequisites for its development. It is imperative, therefore, that institutional reforms compensate for existing deficiencies, and that the global community extends its genuine support and cooperation. In effect, MDG number 8 is paramount among young, transitioning populations.

Keywords: Millenium development goals, age-structural transition, fertility, development.

I. Introduction

Most countries in Asia are still in the intermediate stage of the demographic transition. According to the Population Referree Bureau (2005), only four of 18 countries in Western Asia, three of the 14 countries in South Central Asia, and two of the 11 Southeast Asian countries have achieved replacement or below replacement level fertility. East Asia, however, has completed the demographic transition; all its countries, except Mongolia, now have below replacement level fertility.

An inevitable consequence of the demographic transition is the age-structural transition. Fertility and mortality declines lead to population aging. Whether a population ages quickly or gradually is likewise dependent on the pace of fertility and mortality transition. It is generally accepted, however, that fertility is the more potent force in population aging and the tempo with which this occurs (Kinsella and Phillips, 2005). Countries experiencing dramatic redictions in fertility can expect to age faster than those undergoing gradual fertility decline.

As stated, most counties in Asia are still in the process of completing the demographic transition. Their age-structures reflect this transition. Thus, close to 30% of Asia’s population is below 15 years of age, while only 6% is 65 years old and older. The regions with lower fertility (East and Southeast Asia) have relatively fewer children (21% and 30%, respectively) compared with those of higher fertility (36% for South Central Asia and 34% for Western Asia). Because of their comparable fertility levels, Asia and Latin America also have similar proportions of children and the elderly. Africa has the youngest population in the world (42% under 15 years old and only 3% 65 years and older), while Europe has the oldest (16% of children as well as the elderly). The populations of North America and Oceana are younger than that of Europe, but older than those of Asia and Latin America.

The changing age-structure of a country is an important consideration in the achivement of the MDGs. Fertility, by itself, has significant implications on MDGs because it has immediate links with maternal and child health and has a direct impact on population growth. But fertility also impacts on MDGs through the intervening proces of age-structural change. Figuratively, fertility decline defines the contour of the aging process of a population (as illustrated in the population pyramid), but it is this contour that sets limits as well as expands opportunities for the realization of MDGs.

As a population ages consequent to fertility decline, “a boom” generation – a generation that is larger than those immediately before and after it” – will be gradualy working its way through a country’s age structure (Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2003: xii). This means that, over the years, this dominant birth cohort (born at the time when fertility was at its peak) will be passing from childhood to adolescence, to young and middle adilthood, before reaching old age. At each stage, the cohort brings to the fore the needs and capabilities apropos to the life stage it is undergoing. In more concrete terms, when the “boom” cohort is under 15 years of age (at the early stages of fertility decline), the country will then need to intensify programs and services primary education, childcare, nutrition and health services – all major concertns of MDGs. In time, this large cohort of children will become adolescents and young adults. A population dominated by the youth will need to expand services for secondary and tertiary education, reproductive health care, and employment opportunities – concerns that address gender, poverty and reproductive health issues in the MDGs. When the youths advance to the middle ages, the pressure shifts to the provision of housing, job security, investment opportunities, physical and psycho-social well-being, among others. Finally, when the dominant cohort reaches old age, then the care and welfare of the elderly take precedence. At the micro level, the age-structural transition is mirrored in the preponderance of households at varying stages of the family life cycle. Insofar as MDGs are concerned, it will certainly matter whether a population has proportionately more (or less) households with: 1) young children, 2) adolescents and young adults, 3) older adults, and 4) the elderly. Consumption, productivity, savings and investment patterns are grealy infuenced by the age composition of households. Each of these stages has special implications on the goals of poverty alleviation, universal education, maternal and child health and environmental protection because they relate in specific ways to the dynamics and composition of families and households. The goals and targets of MDGs clearly have age and gender dimensions; therefore, there is a need to integrate age-structural considerations in the planning, implementation and monitoring of MDG programs.

Another aspect of the age-structural transition crucial to the MDGs is its link with development, because development is closely intertwined with the MDGs. This three-way connection is best illustrated in the concept of the “demographic bonus.” A young population has a high child dependency burden, while an old population has many old-age dependents. Therefore, during the early and final stages of the age-structural transition, economic development can stall because the country’s resources are focused on social services and welfare programs for children and old people, respectively, rather than on productive investments. During the intermediate stage of the age-structural transition, however, the population enjoys a respite from high dependency burdens when the working-age population outnumbers the children and the elderly. The predominance of people in the productive ages constitutes a “demographic bonus/divident” or “window of opportunity” for the population to experience rapid economic growth. There is a caveat to this, however. The economic benefits of the demographic bonus can only be realized if the working-age population is fully productive, i.e., adequate human capital investments on health and education, plus a growth facilitating policy environment are in place. If this is so, then substantial income growth, both at the macro and micro levels, can be achieved.

The development and age-structure scenarios describe above link with MDGs in two ways. First, all things being equal, the achievement of MDGs (or lack thereof) is viewed as a by-product of economic growth that is being accelerated (or constrained) by a country’s age structure. In specific terms, slow economic growth during times of high dependency burdens will impede the achivement of MDGs because a country will not have sufficient resources to mobilize MDG programs. Conversely, rapid economic growth fueled by a favorable age structure can fast track the achievement of MDGs. Second, the achievement of MDGs is regarded as a facilitating factor for economic growth because it ensured a healthy, educated and empowered working-age population when the demographic “window of opportunity” presents itself. What all this implies is that, in order to avoid the negative cycle of high dependency burden, low economic growth, failure to achieve MDGs and avail of benefits from the demographic bonus, it is imperative that MDGs be attained during the early stages of the age-structural transition. In doing so, a healthy educated working population can be guaranteed for the intermediate and advanced stages of age-structural change. This performance is faltering. In such cases, institutional factors such as good governance, policies, private-public sector partnerships, and global cooperation (all MDG concerns as well) must play more significant roles.

In the following pages, concrete illustrations of the relationships between fertility, age-structure, development and the MDGs will be presented with the Philippines as case study.

II. Objectives

It is therefore the purpose of this paper to demonstrate, from the Philippine experience the link between fertility transition and the achivement of MDGs via the intervening influence of the age-structural transition. In specific terms, the paper will expound on the relationships between:

1. fertility decline and the age-structural transition,
2. age-structural transition and development,
3. age-structural transition and MDGs, and
4. MDGs and development

It will further explain that these linkages have significant implication on policies that are relevant to the achievement of MDGs.

III. Materials and Methods

The Philippines provides the case study for exploring the relationships between fertility, age-structure and the MDGs. Philippine data are obtained from the census and secondary sources such as the 2003 National Demographic and Health Survey or NDHS (National Statistics Officer Development Goals (United Nations and the Republic of the Philippines, 2005). Where disaggregated data at the provincial and regional levels are accessible, simple correlations of pertinent indicators are presented. Cross-country and inter-regional comparisons are provided to the extent that these are available in the 2005 World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference Bureau.

Because of data and resource constraints, a thorough statistical analysis is not possible in this study: Arguments are made and conclusions reached largely from a theoretical rather than an empirical standpoint. Speculations put forth are informed, as well as limited, by the data at hand.

IV. The Philippine Experience

The Philippines’ fertility and age-structural transitions

In the 2000 census, the Philippines was reported to have a population of 76.5 million. Today it is estimated to have 85.2 million people. Currently, the Philippines is the 12th largest country in the world. In asia, it ranks 7th after China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Japan. By 2050, it may well be the 11th largest country in the worls, and will displace Japan as the 6th largest in Asia (PRB,2005).

The 2000 census also pegged the annual growth rate of the Philippines at 2.3%. By 2015, this growth rate is expected to go down to 1.8% (NSCB, 2005). Growth rates remain relatively high because fertility high because fertility rates have been slow to decline. This is so because a population programs have been sporadic and inconsistent owing to the persistent opposition of the Catholic Church heirarchy to the government’s adoption of a clear and unequivocal population policy (Herrin, 2003). Between 1970 and 1996, the total fertility rate (TFR) of the Philippines decreased from 5.97 to 3.73 births. However, significant declines observed in the decades of the 70s and 80s were not sustained thereafter. The 2003 NDHS (National Statistics Officer and ORC Macro, 2004) reported TFR at 3.5 births. The latest projections from the National Statistics Office (NSO) based on medium series assumption estimate that TFR will reach replacement level (2.07 births) only in 2035 – 2040 (NSCB, 2005). With this trend, the demographic transition of the Philippines is expected to be one of the slowest in Asia (Xemos, 2004).

Consistent with the slugging decline in fertility, the structural aging of the Philippine population has likewise been slow. In 1990, the median age of the population was 19.7; in 2000 it was 21.0 years; by 2015, it is projected to rise to 26.5 years. Population pyramids drawn from the United Nation’s medium variant projections for 1995, 2015 and 2050 provide an illustration of the gradual aging of the Philippine population.

Figure 1. Population pyramids: UN medium series projection,
1995, 2015 and 2050

Table 1 presents the distribution of the Philippine population by broad age categories. It highlights the following features of the country’s age-structural change from 1970 to 2030.

1. the proportion of people under age 15 is declining, but absolute numbers continue to rise until 2025, when a reversal becomes imminent thereafter;
2. the number of elderly people aged (60 and above) more than doubled since 1970; from hereon, it could triple in the next three decades; but its proportion will not reach the 10% mark before 2025;
3. the proportion of youths (aged 5-29) has reached its peak and will gradually decline from 2010 onwards, even as their numbers continue to rise until 2030; and
4. older adults (aged 30-59) continue to increase in number and proportion; they will constitute the biggest segment of the population 10 years from now.

Table 1. Population by major age groups: Philippines 1970 – 2020 (medium series)

The age distribution for 2010 to 2030 given in Table 1 are taken from the medium series projections of the NSO based on the results of the 2000 census. Earlier, the NSO prepared similar projections based on the 1995 census, and published population estimates using assumptions of rapid (low series), moderate (medium series) and slow (high series) pace of fertility decline (NSO, 1997). The low series assumed that replacement level fertility (NRR=1) would be achieved in 2010. Although unrealistic under present conditions, the 1995 low series estimates are present in Table 2 to illustrate, in measurable terms, the impact of the tempo of fertility decline on the Philippine age structure.

Table 2. Population by major age groups: Philippines 1970 – 2020 (low series)

If the Philippines were to achieve replacement fertility in 2010 instead of circa 2030 as currently projected, the country’s population would be smaller by 19 million in 2030. With an average household size of five members, this 19 million translates to an additional 3.8 million households. With respect to age-structural change, the aging of the Philippine population would have been more pronounced. At present, it is expected that by 2030: one-fourth of the population will be under 15 years of age; another one-fourth wil be 15-29 years old; about one-third will be aged 30-59; and about one-tenth will be 60 years old and over. These proportions would be quite different if fertility had declined more steeply. By 2030: only one-fifth of the population would be under age 15; another one-fifth would be 15-29; more than two-fifths (43%) would be in the prime working ages 30-59; and 15% would be 60 years old and older. The timing of age-structural shifts would also have been different. For example, the diminishing trend in the number of children would have been evident before 2010 instead of 2030; the number of youths would begin to decline after 2015 instead of continuing on its upward trend up to 2030; the proportion of middle-aged adults will exceed one-third of total population before 2010 instead of 2015; and the proportion of the elderly will reach 10% in 2020 instead of 2025. Because of the protracted fertility transition in the country, the Philippines will have to confront considerably larger numbers (and proportions) of children who, eventually, will be advancing to adolescence and young adulthood in the next three decades. This demographic development is one that requires attention when probing into economic growth and MDG prospects for the country.

Another important angle to consider in fertility transition is that the pace of fertility decline is not uniform across different sectors of society. Fertility remains at relatively high levels in rural areas, and among the less educated and poorer segments of Philippine society (NSO and ORC Macro, 2004). What this means, therefore, is that the large number of children that the country now had – the same children who will soon become adolescents and young adults – is heavily weighted towards the poor and the less educated. A question that deserves to be asked then is: Will this social economic disadvantage be allowed to persist until these children reach mid and late adulthood? What can be done (or is being done) to break the cycle of high fertility and poverty? To thee questions, the MDG goals hold the key, as will be discussed in the succeeding sections.

Philippine age structure and development

It is common knowledge that the Philippines’ economic performance has not been at par with many of its Asian neighbors (Figure 2). Many factors contribute to this poor performance, including political turmoil, natural disasters, the Asian economic crisis and overall global economic slowdown (National Statistics Office, 2002; United Nations and the Republic of the Philippines, 2005). Economists hasten to add institutional factors and the poor investment climate in the country as contributing factors (Pernia and Salas, 2005). In academic circles, there is also the consensus that high fertility and unrestrained population growth have contributed to the country’s weak economic performance.

A study of 80 developed countries by Mapa and Balisacan (2004), cited in the white paper on “Population and Poverty: The Real Score” of the University of the Philippines School of Economics (2004,p.4) showed that 1) “total population growth exerts a negative and significant effect on economic growth (unfavorable saving and capital shallowing effects)”, and 2) “working age population growth (implying demographic divident), life expectancy at birth (a health indicator), openness to trade, and quality of public institutions (demoting good governance) all show positive and significant effects on economic growth.” In the case of the Philippines, the paper proceeds to explain that the negative effect of population growth “operates via reduced child care and human capital investment at the family level, lower household sector savings for business and government investments, and contraints on allocative efficiency, innovation and entrepreneurship. Population growth requires capital widening to maintain the amount of capital per worker, and the faster such growth the lesser the chances of capital deepening for raising the amount of capital per worker.”

Figure 2. GDP per Capita Growth Rate and Poverty Reduction, Early to Late 1990s

Implicit in these arrangements is the fact that, with the preponderance of children, the age-structure of the Philippines imposes constraints on productive investments because national and household savings are being diminished by large financial outlays for human capital investments on child health, nutrition and education. And since the number of children os continuously growing, provisions for human capital investment will, in time, become inadequate as well. Further, as large cohorts of children reach adolescence and the working ages – as is happening in the present decade – increased pressure on public and private sector employment will ensue. But since savings and productive investments had been greatly reduced, job creation will not be able to cope with demand. In consequence, surplus labor and deficits in human capital investments will render the young adult population less productive.

Economists therefore contend that if high fertility and the unfavorable policy environment persist, the Philippines will miss out on the demographic bonus entirely (Herrin, 2003; Pernia, 2003; and Orbeta, 2002). The exceedingly slow passage through the demographic transition keeps dependency ratios high despite the fact that the country is currently experiencing a youth surge (Gultiano and Xenos, 2005). Unless deficiencies in population and economic policies are promptly and adequately addressed, the “bonus” is not likely to materialize. Ongoing shifts in age structure already pose the immediate and continuing challenge of the people in the productive ages, a challenge that the Philippines is ill-equipped to manage because it is presently caught in what is called a low-level equilibrium trap (Pernia 2003). Government statistics show that the unemployment rate was 11% in October 2004 and underemployment was even higher (17%), despite 3.2 milion jobs purpotedly generated in 2001 to 2004 (United Nations and the Republic of the Philippines, 2005).

However, the Philippine situation may not be altogether dismal. Like some of its Asian neighbors, the Philippines found a pragmatic response to its existing demographic and economic condition. It is pursuing overseas employment for its burgeoning labor force with vigor. From the 2001 and 2002 Surveys of Overseas Filipinos, it has been estimated that close to one million overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) sent 68 billion Pesos in remittances to the home country. This amount represents an increase of 23% from the 55 billion Pesos sent a year earlier (NSO, 2005). These remittances go a long way in servicing the country’s foreign debt. Thus, while Philippine economists perceive the demographic bonus as a far-fetched dream, the reality is that the country’s changing age-structure has contributed, in no small way, to increasing the volume of overseas employment and, therefore, foreign remittances for the country. These remittances also bring the needed boost in human capital investments for education and health because they are essentialy sent to improve the welfare of the OFWs’ families. In fact, one of the Philippine strategies for financing the MDGs expressly states “(t)he tapping of the remittance of OFWs which pass through the formal banking sector to provide both direct and indirect revenues in attaining the MDGs” (United Nations and the Republic of the Philippines, 2005:26). Distorted as it may be but it does represent some kind of demographic bonus that the Philippines is probably enjoying.

The foregoing notwithstanding, overseas employment is clearly not the ideal form of demographic bonus because productive employment takes place outside the home country. Already, despite its expanding labor force, the Philippines is experiencing manpower shortages in key areas such as health care and education – areas of high demand in other countries but also much needed in the Philippines where human capital is gradually being eroded. The Department of Helath and the Department of Education are greatly alarmed by the exodus of their medical practitioners and teachers to foreign lands. Anecdotal evidence abound narrating of doctors who are now enrolled in nursing in order to facilitate their job placement abroad. As high fertility and rapid growth continue, the exacerbation in the deterioration of human capital, plus the exodus of health and teaching professionals are bound to be a formula for national disaster. What once was the Philippines’ comparative advantage in the form of an educational labor force will gradually fade away, and so will its edge in foreign employment. It bears noting that the unprecedented increase in the number (and proportion) of the Filipino working age population is yet to come. One may ask therefore: what is going to be the quality of this labor force and what will it mean to Philippine development?

Age-structure, development and the MDGs

The Second Philippines Progress Report on the Millenium Development Goals (United Nations and the Republic of the Philippines, 2005), paints a fairly optimistic picture of the Philippines prospect of attaining the MDGs Table 3). Of the 17 targets/indicators listed, 12 are reported to have “high” probabilities of attainment. Those with “medium” probability of being achieved have to do with: 1) the prevalence of malnutrition among children 0-5 years old, 2) elementary participation rate of children, 3) improvement in maternal mortality, and 4) prevalence in the use of family planning. One indicator, the elementary cohort survival rate, was rated “low” in achievement probability.

Another study by a group of economists (Collas-Monsod, Monsod and Ducanes, 2004), presents results not too different from, albeit less optimistic than, the official Philippine report. Of the 10 targets that is examined, five had a “high” likelihood of being achieved, namely: 1) accces to safe water, 2) elimination of gender disparities in education, 3) reducing infant and under-five mortality, 4) arresting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, and 5) controlling malaria and other major diseases. Four had “low” likelihood of attainment and thee include: the reduction of people living in extreme poverty, 2) reducing the percentage of the population below minimum level of dietary consumption and the proportion of underweight children under five years old, 3) universal access and completion of primary education, and 4) reduction in maternal mortality. Rated “fair” was the likelihood of universal access to basic reproductive health services.

Table 3. Millenium Development Goals: Rate of Progress

Several factors influence the country’s prospects of achieving the MDGs. The study of Colas-Monsod et al. (2004), for example, reveals that geographical and political factors play important roles in meeting MDG targets. Specifically, climate, topography and land use classification, as well as history, socio-political and cultural milieus, affect the pace with which a provice of geographic unit is able to meet specific goals. In line with arguments presented earlier, it should also be worthwhile to explore the dynamics of age-structure as this relates to the achievement of MDGs.

Based on the two studies mentioned above, there are speciic MDG goals that the Philippines is having moderate to considerable difficulty in meeting. These goals relate to poverty alleviation and malnutrition, universal primary education, maternal mortality and access to family planning and reproductive health services. From the perspective of the fertility transition, it is not surprising that, with the persistence of high fertility, the Philippines is finding it problematic to meet these goals. Maternal mortality and reproductive health care obviously have a direct link with the rate of childbearing. More importantly, it is expected that this link would be more apparent among the poor, the less educated, and rural women who bear the brunt of early, frequent and prolonged childbearing. From the perspective of the fertility transition, it has been explained that, even if fertlity is gradually on the decline, the Philippines is still a young population dominated by children. This is one reason why universal primary education is not an easy goal to achieve. The country’s resources, its physical and social infrastructure, cannot cope with the expansion of the school-age population. And since child dependency ratio remains high particularly among the poor, poverty is perpetuated and exacerbated. A natural consequence of poverty is maltunutrition. To make matters worse, studies have shown (e.g. Slewwe and King, 2001; Glewwe, Jacoby and King, 2001, among others) that malnutrition has significant adverse effects on school participation and achievement among children. What is evident therefore, is that the goals that the Philipines is finding hard to accomplish interact with one another and with the country’s demographic and economic profile, making their attainment all the more difficult.

It is also important to reiterate that the Philippines is currently experiencing a youth surge. At no other time has concernes for adolescent fertility and reproductive health been more urgent. But the sheer number of youths, not to mention their propensity to migrate (Gultiano and Xenos, 2005), makes adequate provision for reproductive health care an enourmous challenge. What is perhaps perplexing is that, in the Philippines there is no gender discrimination as far as education is concerned. Women in fact enjoy an advantage over men in this regard. Yet teenage girls, despite their education, show high prevalence of premarital pregnancy (National Statistics Office and ORC Macro 2004). This is probably proof that universal access to family planning information, supplies, and reproductive health care is truly lacking in the country. This is further underscored by the fact that only 49% of married women use family planning and that 17% of currently married women have an unmet need for family planning, thus facing the risk of unwanted pregnancy.

Limited province-level data, assembled for the purpose of this paper, also help to demonstrate some of the relationships between age-structure and selected proxy indicators of MDGs. The data show that the prevalence of child labor (a proxy for limitations in school participation / performance of children, as well as income inadequacy) is positively correlated with the TFR and negatively correlated with the proportion of adults in their prime working ages (Table 4). They also show that the median age of the provincial population is negatively associated with the prevalence of underweight children and stunted children in the provinces. The proportion of couples practicing family planning is positively correlated with the median age.

Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients between demographic and MDG indicators

The pathways by which age structure affects MDGs are umerous. Many of these come in the form of interactions between age structure and development. As shown, a young age structure tends to inhibit economic growth because it requires that resources be channeled into education, health and nutrition of children instead of production. In investing on the young, the country would have been closer to meeting some of its MDG goals. However, these human capital investments (and the MDGs) need financing that can be guaranteed only by a robust economy. The Philippine economy is not such, partly because of its young age structure. Ironically, the Philippines’ strategy for financing MDG programs stipulates that revenue generation through tax collection and savings be increased (United Nations and the Republic of the Philippines, 2005:26). There is however, an inherent incongruence between the size of the tax-paying population (and the volume of savings it generates) and the young age structure of the country. Under these circumstances, therefore, it is important that the Philippines pursue other compensating mechanisms, such as sound policies and good governance (including fiscal reforms and related measures) and increased international assistance – themselves MDG targets – in order to advance the rest of its MDG agenda.

Despite the obstacles, it is important to recognize that the achievement of MDGs is, in itself, a prerequisite for development. Keeping in mind that the expansion of the prime working-age population is looming in the horizon, the Philippines would do well to ensure that the children and adolescents of today will grow up to be highly productive citizens of tomorrow. The MDGs, with its emphasis on enhancing human capital, managing population and alleviating poverty, are clearly a means to this end. The MDGs are a prescription for productivity, as much as they are for human welfare – and more so for countries that are transitioning from a young to an old population, and poised in the gateway of the demographic “window of opportunity.”

V. Implications

From the foregoing, it has been demonstrated that the achievement of the MDGs is influenced by a confluence of demographic, economic, institutional and other factors. This paper, however, has focused on the direct effects of the fertility transition in the realization of the MDGs, and its indirect effect through the age-structured transition.

The changing age-structure of the Philippines provided an illustration of how the achievement of MDGs can be impeded by the age composition of a population. A country with a young population and a high dependency burden is hard put to achieve rapid and sustained economic growth and durable poverty reduction. As a result, MDG programs are faced with the dual challenge of having to reach a larger population-in-need, and without the adequate financial resources to do so. Ironically, it is precisely the achievement of MDGs that holds the promise of breaking the country’s cycle of high fertility, weak economic growth, and poverty. Furthermore, with the aging of the population, it becomes crucial that MDG targets are met for the country to take advantage of the demographic “window of opportunity” therby reaping the demographic dividend.

The Philippine experience is not unique in Asia (or the rest of the world) even if its fertility and age-structural transition has been slow in comparison with other developing countries. It remains true that many of its Asian neighbors are also transtioning from a young to an old population. With the exception of the resource and oil-rich countries in Asia, many nations are also economically challeged. The achievement of MDGs becomes even more important for these transitioning populations. However, their governments must realize that there is no easy way of meeting the MDG targets with its present demographic and economic conditions. It will require considerable political will and fortitude on their part. Equally important is the recognition by the global community that their cooperation is needed in this endeavor, and that such recognition must be matched with appropriate action.

Published in the Philippine Population Review Vol. 4 Number 1; January – December 2005.

For author notes and references, get in touch with the Philippine Population Review (PPR), Philippine Population Association (PPA), c/o UP Population Institute, Palma Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City 1101, Philippines. PPR telefax number: (632) 920-5402; E-Mail address: ppaphils@yahoo.com.